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Some Thoughts on Rellgion, Abstinence-Only, 
and Sex Education in the Public Schools 
by Frank S. Ravitch· 
I. Introduction 
As the title suggests, this article reflects my 
recent thoughts regarding abstinence-only and 
sex education programs under the religion 
clauses. The article, which is based on a 
presentation given at the 2006 AALS Annual 
Meeting during the aptly named panel: Clash of 
the Titans: Sex, Religion and Morality in America's 
Schools, addresses two primary issues. First, 
whether abstinence-only programs in the public 
schools violate the Establishment Clause. 
Second, whether parents or students have a 
right to opt-out of sex education courses under 
the Free Exercise Clause. The following 
discussion is essentially a modified excerpt 
from a forthcoming book titled: MASTERS OF 
ILLUSION: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
RELIGION CLAUSES. I Specifically, the material 
is taken from the chapter addressing the 
definition of religion under the religion clauses. 
As will soon become clear, the Establishment 
Clause question, at least, is heavily intertwined 
with how the courts view the nature of religion. 
Part II. 1. of this article will address the 
question of abstinence-only programs under 
the Establishment Clause and suggest that 
some, but not all, of these programs violate the 
Establishment Clause both under the Court's 
current tests and the facilitation test I have 
proposed elsewhere.2 Part II. 2. will discuss the 
question of exemptions from general sex 
education programs under the Free Exercise 
Clause. The greatest potential for exemptions 
arises from the concept of "hybrid rights" or 
under state ReligiOUS Freedom Restoration Acts 
or state constitutional provisions. This Part will 
address when, why, and how such exemptions 
might be granted. Part III will provide a brief 
conclusion. 
II. Teaching Morality and Sex 
Education in Public Schools 
The issue of teaching morality and sex 
education in public schools involves both 
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Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause 
concerns. The free exercise concerns arise when 
parents seek exemptions to sex education 
instruction or other similar programs, or even 
removal. of such programs from the general 
curriculum. 3 The establishment issues arise 
when schools teach abstinence-only programs 
that. have an uncanny resemblance to the 
religious views of certain groups; and 
sometimes, a direct connection to religiOUS 
entities which developed the curricula. 4 
Another area where establishment issues arise 
is when schools seek to teach morality directly 
through the curriculum or school-sponsored 
programs.s Most broad morality programs are 
secularly based and don't run afoul of the 
Establishment Clause, but some either have a 
theological connection to a given religion or 
religions, or use clergy in a manner that gives 
rise to Establishment Clause concerns. 6 The 
meaning of religion should be at the core of 
Establishment Clause analysis in sex education 
cases. The next section will focus heavily on 
the establishment issues. Free exercise issues 
raise the "religion" question in a more 
traditional way and thus will be addressed after 
discussing the establishment questions. 
1. The Establishment Clause 
Abstinence-only programs present a number of 
interesting questions. For instance, few of these 
programs advertise themselves as religious, but 
are they "religion" for purposes of the 
Establishment Clause? Some scholars have 
certainly argued that they are. 7 The reasoning 
behind this school of thought is that while 
most sex education programs teach abstinence 
in addition to other forms of protection, some 
abstinence-only programs ignore or misstate 
information on contraception that would help 
prevent unwanted teenage pregnancies and the 
spread of sexually transmitted diseases 
("STDs").8 Thus, the argument goes, such 
programs cannot serve the goal of promoting 
children's health and welfare; some argue that 
in fact, such programs may promote even 
greater spread of STDs.9 Moreover, some of 
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these programs openly demean homosexuality 
or discuss it only in the context of AIDS or 
other STDs.1O This can have a negative impact 
on the mental health of gay youth and on the 
perceptions of their classmates. II However, 
while these may be powerful arguments for the 
shortsightedness and perhaps naivete of most 
abstinence-only programs, these arguments do 
not necessarily support the argument, without 
more evidence, that such programs are in fact 
religious. 
The "more" comes in the form of the 
organizations and interests that promote 
abstinence-only programs and, sometimes, the 
statements of school boards that adopt them 
and school officials that execute them. 12 In 
some cases, the programs' treatment of 
homosexuality and other sexual issues seem to 
directly reflect conservative Christian the-
010gy.13 The problem with defining "religion" 
in this context is that despite the evidence that 
some, if not most of these programs are 
religiously motivated, religious motivation does 
not necessarily make a given program religious. 
If every policy that had some religiOUS 
motivation were an establishment of religion, 
religious motivation would render everything 
that stems from it religion. 14 The Court, wisely, 
has treaded carefully on this issue, distin-
guishing situations where religious purpose was 
obvious from those where religion may have 
been just one of a number of motivating 
factors. 15 Under this method of comparison, 
the abstinence-only programs that are easily 
connected to religion would be unconstitu-
tional (even though in actuality, religiOUS 
purpose becomes a substitute for "religion" in 
such cases).16 For the remainder of the 
programs, however, the underlying question of 
whether such programs constitute "religion" 
remains unanswered. 
Perhaps the best analogy to this situation 
comes from Justice Stevens' opinion concurring 
in part and dissenting in part in Webster v. 
Reproductive Health Services. I? In the opinion he 
discusses the nature of the preamble to a 
Missouri statute regulating abortion, which 
stated that life begins at conception and that 
conception occurs at fertilization. IS Stevens' 
discussion focuses on the purpose of this 
preamble and thus is consistent with a long 
line of legislative purpose analysis in the 
Establishment Clause context. Justice Stevens 
ultimately concludes that even without 
evidence of legislative purpose, the correlation 
between the legislative statement in the 
preamble and the tenets of certain religiOUS 
doctrines, and the lack of any other plausible 
secular basis for the statement, is enough to 
render the preamble unconstitutional under 
the Establishment Clause;19 i.e., he implies that 
the preamble's assertion is religious despite the 
lack of any express citation to religious sources. 
The definition of religion set forth in this 
article would support Justice Stevens' 
conclusion and suggest that some of the 
abstinence-only programs are also inherently 
religious, even though they may not clearly 
explain why. The natural question is how these 
things constitute "religion" for Establishment 
Clause purposes, and how the definition of 
religion is affected by secular purpose analysis. 
The latter question can be easily answered: 
while there may be some factual, or even 
conceptual, overlap in the definition of religion 
and secular purpose analYSiS, the recognition 
that something constitutes religion is not based 
on secular purpose analysis. This will become 
clearer through the following example. 
Assume that the public schools in a small 
town dominated by conservative Christian 
values teaches a form of abstinence sex 
education that favors abstinence over the 
alternatives, but also teaches about contra-
ception and abortion because of fear that lack 
of such teaching might lead to STDs or 
unwanted pregnancies among those who stray 
from "community values." Moreover, homo-
sexuality is barely mentioned in the program, 
but homosexuals are not disparaged. Commu-
nity members and school board members 
discussed the form of the program in open 
meetings. Many expressed a preference for a 
religiously based abstinence-only program, and 
all expressed their support for community 
religious values. In the end, however, the voices 
favoring a broader abstinence program 
including the abovementioned factors won out. 
There would seem to be a religious purpose on 
the part of the schools for choosing even the 
broader abstinence program over general sex 
education curricula, and a court might 
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conclude there was no secular purpose 
(although a court might also conclude that 
religion was just one factor and that concern 
for the health and safety of the students was an 
overriding factor given the end result of the 
community discussion). 
Before reaching the purpose question, 
however, one would need to determine whether 
the program could even be considered religion 
or religious. If not, there is no Establishment 
Clause issue in the first place. The program 
does seem to have some theological connection 
to the dominant faith community in the area 
given its focus on abstinence, but at the same 
time it teaches material that would seem to go 
against that same theology. Is some theological 
connection enough to make this program 
subject to Establishment Clause scrutiny? Keep 
in mind that the answer to this question is 
simply a gatekeeping answer, because even if 
the program were considered within the realm 
of religion for Establishment Clause purposes, 
it may yet be found constitutional. The 
problem in the abstinence-only context is that 
finding the program to be religiously affected 
may influence the Establishment Clause 
analysis in a way that a similar finding may not 
in other contexts. The example above is a close 
call, but the fact that the program has some 
connection to core theology is not enough to 
make it "religion" given the other factors. Yet, 
most abstinence-only programs do not share 
the mitigating factors with the above 
hypothetical and thus many abstinence 
programs could be subject to Establishment 
Clause scrutiny. There may be a "chicken and 
the egg" element here, because the hypothetical 
situation would probably survive Establishment 
Clause scrutiny under the facilitation test 
discussed later in this article (and under the 
Court's current tests). Conversely, many 
abstinence-only programs would fail the 
facilitation test because they have too close a 
theological connection and facilitate certain 
religious views at the expense of student health 
interests. 
In the end, the question of whether 
abstinence-only programs violate the Estab-
lishment Clause cannot sensibly be answered 
without addressing the question of what 
constitutes "religion" under that clause. The 
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substitute question used by the courts-
whether there is. a secular purpose for the 
program-may lead to results that are both 
under-inclusive and over-inclusive unless the 
"religion" question is addressed first. Once that 
question is addressed (assuming the answer is 
that the program could constitute religion) we 
can move on to the Establishment Clause 
inquiry relating to secular purpose-a question 
that may have already been partially answered 
in the analysis of whether the program is itself 
religion or religious. 
One might view this issue as implicating 
the debate over "PARs" or publicly accessible 
reasons.20 The PAR debate is longstanding and 
far beyond the scope of this article. In short, 
the debate involves the question as to whether 
government action that is religiously motivated 
should have a publicly accessible reason or 
. reasons that nonbelievers might accept as a 
valid basis for the law.21 There are many 
sophisticated arguments from all sides in the 
debate. Some argue that publicly accessible 
reasons are unnecessary because religious 
motivation should not condemn a law that has 
secular benefits.22 Others argue that such 
reasons are necessary because when the 
government acts based on religiOUS beliefs (or 
other comprehensive belief systems) political 
discourse becomes inaccessible to those who do 
not subscribe to the comprehensive belief 
system or systems (and some may understand 
all too well the reasons for the law and thus be 
made to feel like outsiders in the political 
discourse).23 Still others argue that such 
reasons-if used to cover over religious 
reasons-are problematic because they allow 
government to establish religious tenets 
without providing those who may challenge 
those tenets with the means to ascertain the 
government actors' "real" reasons. 24 Finally, 
some argue that the whole debate is somewhat 
moot because at least when dealing with 
legislative action, there may be no way to glean 
the various motivations of government actors 
or purposes for given actions (and of course, 
even an individual legislator may be motivated 
by more than one factor, so PARs could exist 
for almost any government action depending 
on how it is viewed). 
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Thus, the search for PARs or religious 
motivation is a search into a tangled web of 
motivation that may be supported by little 
proof. This, of course, is a vast over-
simplification of the many sophisticated 
positions in the debate, but for present 
purposes it will do because the abstinence-only 
question exists in a realm where in many cases 
there will be ostensible PARs, but at the same 
time many will reject that these reasons are 
publicly accessible because they make no sense 
in the "real world" and thus must be motivated 
by religion. In other words, the very question 
of whether there are PARs in this context is so 
highly contestable by both sides of the debate 
that one need not take a position in the 
broader PAR debate to address this issue. 
Moreover, given the facilitation test's 
primary focus on the effects of government 
action, a law that was supported by PARs may 
still be religious and may still violate the 
Establishment Clause. It is conceivable, but less 
likely, that a law with no PARs may still be 
found constitutional given the way it actually 
functions. Still, if someone views abstinence-
only programs as irrational and naive responses 
to current trends among teens, it may be 
impossible to convince that person there is any 
plausible PAR for such a policy, especially in 
light of the demographics of those who usually 
support such programs. At the same time, if 
someone views abstinence as the only and best 
option for preventing teenage pregnancy and 
the spread of STDs, it would be hard to 
convince such a person--even if she were 
motivated by religious concerns-that there are 
no PARs for such a policy. So, for now, we will 
leave the PAR debate aside and focus on the 
basic question of whether abstinence-only 
programs violate the Establishment Clause. 
In the Establishment Clause arena, the 
definition of religion is affected by the context 
of the given case. Thus, the meaning of religion 
in the context of a religious symbolism case 
may be different than in a government aid 
case. The one thing that the definition should 
include in all Establishment Clause cases is 
some core of theological principles or beliefs. 
These principles or beliefs do not necessarily 
need to be deity-related, but they should relate 
to questions that may best be expressed as 
ultimate truths or goals. The abstinence-only 
context is a particularly tough one to address 
because of the variety of programs and 
circumstances underlying them, the seemingly 
obvious connection to religious beliefs, groups 
and values, and the reality that this connection 
may not always be easy to prove even where it 
exists. It is no secret that the biggest 
proponents of abstinence-only programs are 
certain faith groupS.25 It is also no secret that 
some of these groups have had a role in 
funding or developing some abstinence-only 
curricula and in lobbying the federal and state 
governments to support such programs. 26 
Moreover, abstinence-only programs reflect the 
theolOgical and social views of these groups 
regarding sex and sexual activity. 27 The 
problem is that such programs may also be 
supported by people or groups with no 
religiOUS affiliation or those who support such 
programs based on reasons other than their 
faith. This means that for such programs to 
qualify as religion under the Establishment 
Clause, there must be some more direct link to 
religious theology or religious entities. 
This link can take several forms. One form 
might be programs that define life as beginning 
at conception or make other primarily 
theolOgical claims regarding sexuality. Similar 
to Justice Stevens' argument in Webster, there 
is no serious secular reason to make the claim 
that life begins at conception or to disparage 
homosexuality in order to teach an abstinence-
only program.28 Another form might include 
programs or curricula developed by a religious 
entity or by an individual with close 
connections to a religious entity or entities, 
which connections might include substantial 
funding. A third form would include programs 
that include direct religious references in the 
materials. A fourth might include programs 
enacted or administered against a background 
or context where it is apparent religion is being 
taught or favored (this analysis may cross over 
heavily with secular purpose and effects 
analYSis). 
If any or all of these links exist it is likely 
that the program will be "religious" and thus 
subject to challenge under the Establishment 
Clause. This is because these factors all point 
to a theologically or otherwise religiously 
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infused curriculum. Whether anyone of these 
factors is met would be a question of fact and, 
for some factors, a question of degree. Of 
course, even if a program is religious for 
purposes of the Establishment Clause, it must 
still be analyzed under that clause to determine 
whether it violates the Constitution. 
Under the Court's traditional tests, 
programs that involve primarily theological 
claims regarding sexuality, include direct 
religious references, or are created or admin-
stered against a background where religion is 
being taught or favored, would most likely be 
found unconstitutional under an endorsement 
or Lemon analysis because direct religious 
references or making theologically charged 
claims about sexuality will have a primary 
effect that advances religion, especially if the 
program could be run without those connec-
tions. 29 Depending on the facts, such a 
program may also lack a secular purpose. 
Programs enacted or administered against a 
background or context where it is apparent 
religion is being taught or favored would most 
likely violate the secular purpose prong of 
Lemon.3o Such a program may also violate the 
effects prong of Lemon. Significantly, recent 
decisions by the Court suggest that outside of 
the aid context, divisiveness-traditionally an 
element of the entanglement prong of Lemon-
remains a factor in some cases.3J Thus, these 
programs may also involve entanglement based 
on divisiveness as well as institutional 
entanglement depending on how they are 
structured and administered. Programs that 
were developed or funded by a religious entity 
or those with close institutional connections to 
a religious entity or entities may be found 
unconstitutional under the secular purpose or 
entanglement prongs, but this would be a 
particularly fact sensitive analysis. Moreover, if 
a program developed or funded by a religious 
entity has religious content it would most 
likely violate one of the other factors. If not, 
the program is more likely to be constitutional. 
Endorsement analysis would likely lead to 
similar conclusions because a reasonable 
observer would most likely view any of the 
above links as favoring the religious sect or 
sects that support the program and treating as 
outsiders those who do not share the 
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"community values" reflected in the program.32 
Thus, the purpose and/or effect of such 
programs would be to endorse religion.33 This 
is, of course, a highly fact-sensitive analysis and 
some programs with similar content to 
constitutional programs may be found 
unconstitutional depending on the differences 
between the programs and the facts 
surrounding the creation, institution, and 
administration of the programs. 
Interestingly, under a coercion analysis the 
fact that a given program constitutes "religion" 
and that these classes are generally mandatory 
may support a claim for coercion. The classes 
would in essence be a formal religious exercise 
(or event) that dissenting students would in a 
real sense feel compelled (or literally be 
compelled) to attend.34 It is possible that an 
opt-out option would save some programs 
under a coercion analysis, because students 
would not feel compelled to attend, but even 
with such a provision students may feel 
coerced to attend due to peer pressure.35 Thus, 
the specific facts of a given case and the court 
interpreting those facts would have a major 
impact on the coercion analysis where an opt 
out provision exists. Still, the fact that the 
program would likely violate the Lemon and 
endorsement tests would ordinarily be enough 
to deem it unconstitutional. 36 
The facilitation test I have proposed else-
where would suggest that many, but not all, of 
these programs are unconstitutional. The 
details of the test are spelled out in greater 
detail in MASTERS OF ILLUSION.37 For now it is 
enough to note that a program that takes a 
theological position, is developed by a religious 
entity, includes religious content and/or was 
created, enacted, or administered under 
circumstances favoring religion or specific 
religions, would substantially facilitate religion. 
Such a program would be using the public 
schools to promote a religiously based ideology, 
while at the same time denying students 
information that may help protect them from 
STDs or unwanted pregnancies because of that 
religious ideology. 38 Certainly, not all 
abstinence-only programs will involve the 
abovementioned factors. Those programs that 
do not substantially facilitate religion may be 
unwise and naive, but they would not be 
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unconstitutional. The effects of the program 
would be essential to this analysis, but the 
nature and creation of the program would also 
be relevant. 
2. The Free Exercise Clause 
The question that arises under the Free 
Exercise Clause is whether religious parents or 
students can demand an exemption to all or 
part of a general sex education curriculum 
based on religious objections to the content of 
these programs. This is often referred to as the 
ability to "opt-out" of the programs.39 Schools, 
of course, have the ability to grant opt-out 
exemptions to religious students if they choose 
to do So,4O but the harder question is whether 
the Free Exercise Clause mandates such 
exemptions. Given the Court's decision in 
Employment Division v. Smith,41 many have 
assumed that opt-out exemptions are not 
mandated by the Free Exercise Clause. The 
Smith Court held that when the government 
enacts and applies a law of general applicability 
(a school curriculum would be considered 
generally applicable) there is no duty to 
provide an exemption to that law under the 
Free Exercise Clause even if the failure to 
exempt places a substantial burden on the 
complaining party. 42 
However, the Smith Court created the 
concept of hybrid rights; situations where the 
free exercise right combines with other 
fundamental rights such as free speech or 
parental rights to mandate an exemption unless 
the government meets a higher burden (most 
likely a compelling government interest and 
narrow tailoring)Y Many scholars, including 
this author, believe that the hybrid rights idea 
was a means for the Smith Court to get around 
inconvenient precedent, namely Wisconsin v. 
Yoder44 and West Virginia Board of Education v. 
Barnette.45 The hybrid rights concept is odd 
because the Court seems to be saying an 
otherwise inadequate free exercise claim can 
become adequate if mixed with another 
fundamental right, but this leaves two options. 
First, the independent fundamental right is 
also inadequate by itself to support relief in 
which case it is hard to understand how two 
inadequate constitutional claims can render 
each other adequate. Second, the hybrid right 
is itself adequate to grant relief in which case 
the free exercise claim is unnecessary.46 The 
Smith analysis is itself problematic and the 
hybrid rights concept seems to be an attempt 
by conservative judicial activists to cover their 
activist tracks just as an earlier liberal activist 
Court attempted to do in Sherbert v. Verner 
when it failed to adequately address Braunfeld 
v. BrownY Whatever its purpose, the hybrids 
rights concept has been used inconsistently by 
lower courts. 48 
The hybrid rights concept may have 
significant import in the conteXt of requests for 
opt-out exemptions from sex education 
curricula. This question is still an open one, 
and the suggestions herein are simply that, 
suggestions as to how such a scenario might 
play out. Simply put, in some cases schools will 
have a duty to provide exemptions to allow 
students to opt out of sex education courses or 
portions of those courses. The basis for this 
assertion is the hybrid rights concept (as well 
as state Religious Freedom Restoration Acts 
("RFRAs") and state constitutional provisions). 
The question of defining religion arising in 
these cases is whether the asserted religious 
concern is "religious" or simply social. In most 
cases, the answer will be obvious (and will be 
religious or both religious and social); and in 
cases where it is less clear, courts have generally 
given great deference to complainants' 
assertions that a given concern is religious. I 
assert in MAsTERS OF ILLUSION that such 
deference is appropriate in the Free Exercise 
Clause context where the definition of religion 
should be broader. There is at least a plausible 
free exercise concern in most cases involving a 
denial of an opt-out exemption to a sex 
education curriculum. 
The quintessential hybrid rights in Smith 
were freedom of expression, and more relevant 
here, parental rights.49 As mentioned above, 
the hybrid rights concept was used as a means 
by the Smith Court to distinguish Yoder, which 
itself involved a parental rights element;50 
although the Smith Court greatly overstated the 
relevance of that element to the outcome in 
Yoder. 5 I Thus, if a parent asserts the right to 
direct the upbringing of his or her child 
combined with a free exercise right, courts may 
find a hybrid right exists and require the 
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application of a higher burden on the 
government such as the compelling interest 
test. 52 Of course, from a children's rights 
perspective such a recognition of parental will 
is not necessarily a good social outcome, but 
that question is beyond the scope of this 
article. In fact, even if a student sought the 
exemption on behalf of herself there is a 
plausible hybrid rights claim based on freedom 
of expression and/or association (although 
absent a free exercise claim such claims will 
generally fail in the public school context).53 If 
a hybrid right is found, courts may apply the 
compelling interest test as developed in Sherbert 
v. Verner and its progeny. 54 Thus, courts will 
look to see whether the failure to provide an 
exemption places a burden on the religious 
practices/faith of the complainant, whether the 
government has a compelling interest for 
denying the exemption, and whether the denial 
is narrowly tailored to meet that interest. 55 
Courts tend to be deferential to 
complainants' claims that their religious beliefs 
or practices are burdened by a given 
governmental action.56 In the case of opt-out 
exemptions, the parents could assert that sex 
education curricula undermine the religious 
values regarding family life, sex, and sexuality 
required by their faith and central to their 
family life, and that exposure to sex education 
might cause the child to act against his or her 
faith or question the values taught at home and 
by the faith. 57 This is a tricky argument 
because it may be hard to distinguish sex 
education from other portions of the secular 
curriculum here and courts may fear a slippery 
slope.58 Still, other than perhaps the teaching 
of evolution, sex education is the only area 
where there is likely to be a viable claim that 
the lessons so directly conflict with family 
values and religious beliefs so as to burden 
religious freedom. 
Next, the government would need to 
demonstrate a compelling interest for denying 
the exemption. The government obviously has 
a compelling interest in teaching sex education 
-i.e., the health and safety of students-but 
does that interest translate into one supporting 
the denial of an exemption? As in Yoder, this 
may be harder to show-especially if the 
parents or student can show that the religious 
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values relating to such issues are inculcated at 
home and that at the very least the student is 
being taught about abstinence. The state's 
burden would be harder still if the family can 
show that the rate of STD transmission and 
unwanted pregnancies are significantly lower in 
their faith community than among the general 
school population. 59 Still, the government 
could argue that exempting any child from sex 
education potentially exposes that child to 
health risks that could be passed to other 
children and that portions of the curriculum 
are not likely to be objectionable to the 
family.60 This will be a difficult decision for a 
court, but if the family can show (as did the 
families in Yoder) that the risk is minimal in 
their faith community and that alternative 
approaches are being taught at home, the 
school may lose on this element.61 
Assuming the school does have a 
compelling interest in denying an exemption, 
the question remains whether denying the 
exemption is narrowly tailored to meet that 
interest.62 It is possible that the student might 
be exempted only from the objectionable 
portions of the course or that the school could 
require the family to demonstrate that 
alternative, but religiously acceptable, lessons 
are being given to the child such as training in 
the risks of STDs, perhaps in the context of 
abstinence. If the parents can demonstrate that 
the state's interest is not served by denying the 
exemption to their child because of the low risk 
that the child would be involved in the types of 
activities the school is concerned about, the 
school would likely lose the narrow tailoring 
argument. In sum, there are many ways for 
parents to win under the compelling interest 
test and fewer ways for the school to win. 
Schools may want to consider simply 
exempting students to avoid a protracted legal 
battle. Of course, a strong argument for schools 
that do enter the legal fray is that there is no 
hybrid right involved under the facts of the 
given case.63 
Hybrid rights claims are not the only basis 
for reviewing the denial of an opt-out 
exemption under the compelling interest 
standard. Many states have RFRAs which 
require that the compelling interest test be 
applied in all cases involving the denial of an 
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exemption from a generally applicable state or 
locallaw.64 Still other states provide for such a 
requirement under their state constitutions.65 
So there may be many circumstances where the 
compelling interest test could be applied to the 
denial of an opt-out exemption. The 
facilitation test would require an exemption in 
most of these cases because a failure to provide 
one would substantially interfere with 
religion. 66 The broader policy issue of whether 
parents should have the right to demand an 
opt-out for a child is irrelevant to the religion 
clause question under the facilitation test 
except where the student objects to the 
parents' choices, in which case a court would 
have to determine under state law who has the 
right to make curricular decisions for the 
student. Of course, arguments from outside the 
religion clauses might be made to dispute the 
parental rights in opt-out cases, but these are 
beyond the scope of this article. 
III. Conclusion 
Abstinence-only programs pose serious 
questions regarding the meaning of religion 
under the Establishment Clause. Some of these 
programs are "religious" and violate the Clause, 
and others are not-so either the Clause does 
not apply to them, or they will survive scrutiny 
under the Clause. As with most Establishment 
Clause issues the inquiry is fact-sensitive. 
Similarly, based on a fact sensitive analysis, 
some parents and students may have a 
constitutional right to opt-out of general sex 
education programs based on hybrid rights 
analysis. Still, in some cases schools may be 
able to show no hybrid right exists under the 
facts or be able to meet the compelling interest 
test most likely triggered by a hybrid rights 
claim.67 In the end, abstinence-only and sex 
education programs raise cutting-edge issues 
under both of the religion clauses and observers 
can expect a mixed bag of outcomes in cases 
involving these programs. 
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